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DE-LINKING: DON QUIXOTE, 
GLOBALIZATION AND THE COLONIES
Walter D. Mignolo
Don Quixote is a “literary” achievement of a European historical 
process and a major literary contribution of Europe to the world and to 
diverse human histories and civilizations. Don Quixote was to Europe 
what pyramids were to the Egyptians, or calendars to the makers and 
carriers of Mayan civilization. At the height of European national-
ism and the particular articulation of Eurocentrism that nationalism 
nourished (e.g., nation-state building and values following the U.S. 
and French revolutions), Don Quixote and the other masterpieces of 
European literature were all works in modern imperial languages, 
grounded in Greek and Latin traditions. These historical processes, 
especially the consolidation of modern imperial languages and the 
celebration of Greek and Latin, were simultaneous with the rejection of 
the debt that European intellectual history owed to the Arabic transla-
tion of Greek authors. The simultaneity of both processes contributed 
to the great achievements of humanity and to the dichotomy between 
the accumulation of money and the accumulation of meaning that put 
Western Europe at the center of global capitalism and global episte-
mology (which was the theoretical justification of artistic practices—
from painting to literature, from music to sculpture). Some of the great 
achievements in European history were also simultaneous with the 
destruction and disavowal of the achievements of the Aztecs and Incas, 
as well as with the denial of humanity to Africans transported as slave 
labor to the New World. The celebration of Cervantes’s achievement in 
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Don Quixote shall not—at this point in history—continue to reproduce 
the darker side of the European Renaissance.
I am asking, therefore, a reading of Don Quixote that is attentive 
to the demands that motivated Cervantes to write it. How can we 
link the present of Cervantes to our own present? My thesis is that 
Cervantes was experiencing the emergence of the sovereignty of the 
modern subject that rejected the authority of Theology. He was liv-
ing in the moment of transition from Theology to “Ego-logy” (that 
René Descartes formulated in philosophical language a few decades 
after the publication of Don Quixote). Today, however, we are all living 
during a different kind of transition. This transition is highlighted by 
the coming into being of the decolonial subject. “Coming into being” 
translates to the decolonization of being. If, then, a decolonial subject is 
emerging in our era, when was that subject colonized? The paradox is 
that the coloniality of being—the colonization of subjects in the mod-
ern world—was one of the consequences of the European Renaissance 
and the expansion of European imperial/colonial designs. Cervantes 
wrote Don Quixote approximately one century after the colonization of 
America (for some) and the invention of America (for others).
One reading available to us today is within a paradigm of coexis-
tence rather than “a new reading” within the paradigm of Western 
genres, thought, sensibility, and the very concept of literature. The 
game of solving all the problems within Eurocentered paradigms of 
thought that “think about” the others is over. The others began to think 
for themselves in relation to Europe almost five centuries ago, when 
they realized that the “wonderful” solutions Europeans had for their 
lives were not convincing to them. That happened in the Americas in 
the sixteenth century and continues to happen in Iraq in the twenty-
first century, only it is not Europe but the U.S. that is continuing the 
mission toward a future of glory and happiness for all. Thus, the 
other began to think a long time ago, but it was shut off. Of course, 
why would European men take into consideration what other people 
thought if they had the solution for all of them? The Europeans knew 
how to manage happiness for all.
Waman Puma de Ayala, a Quechua speaker from Yancavalica (a 
community near Cuzco that was the center of the Incanate or the Inca 
Empire, in Eurocentered vocabulary), offers an anchor to speak from a 
paradigm of coexistence. A contemporary of Cervantes, Waman Puma 
is struggling not to assert the modern subject but, rather, to decol-
onize the colonial subject. Of the same generation as Cervantes, he 
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finished in 1616 and sent to Philip III a manuscript consisting of draw-
ings and texts written in broken Spanish, titled Nueva corónica y buen 
gobierno. It was a story of indigenous people of the Andes, partially 
or badly understood by Spanish chroniclers; a story that was neces-
sary for the establishment of a good government, ruled and shared by 
Spaniards and “Indians” (the generic name given by the Spaniards to 
the diversity of Aymara- and Quechua-speaking communities). The 
point here is that while Cervantes, in Spain at the inception of mod-
ern Europe, was contributing to the formation of the modern subject, 
released from theological authority, Waman Puma, in the colonies, 
was doing something similar but at the same time different. He was 
striving to decolonize Quechua and Aymara subjects. Put in different 
words, while Cervantes was critiquing Spain in Spain—imperial for-
mation from inside the empire—and liberating the subject from Theol-
ogy entrenched with imperialism (see Frederick de Armas’s essay in 
this volume), Waman Puma was critiquing imperial/colonial formation 
in the colonies. Cervantes’s subjectivity was formed in the legacies of 
Greek, Latin, and Castilian (as one of the six European and imperial 
vernacular languages). Waman Puma’s subjectivity was formed in the 
memories of Quechua and Aymara, disrupted by the invasion of Cas-
tilian languages, political theory, subjectivity, and rapacious economic 
interests. The disturbing complexity of Waman Puma’s text parallels 
the well-crafted, layered mirror-effects and humorous Don Quixote, 
but for different reasons. Waman Puma was thinking, drawing, and 
writing at the very crack of the colonial difference: a spatial epistemic 
break irreducible to the mono-topic and linear time of the European 
construction of its own history, from Greece to Rome to modern capi-
talist empires of the Atlantic (Spain and England mainly, but also Hol-
land and France). Waman Puma introduced something I would like 
to call (after Mary Gossy’s talk) “the decolonial queer” in the precise 
sense that Waman Puma disrupts, on the one hand, the imperial norms 
that the Spaniards intended to force upon well-established Andean 
society in its entire order of life and, on the other, introduces the deco-
lonial principle of thinking (e.g., decolonial thinking) that has never 
stopped but was silenced by modern and imperial epistemology from 
the European Renaissance until now.
Thus, instead of reading Don Quixote from the principles of knowl-
edge and understanding inherited from Greek and Latin—that since 
the European Renaissance and through European imperial expansion, 
from religion to economy, from subjectivity to knowledge, was assumed 
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to be universal—I will read it from the colonies, from the silenced epis-
temology introduced by Waman Puma which, in the twentieth century, 
we find in Frantz Fanon’s Black Skin, White Masks (1952), Vine Deloria, 
Jr.’s Custer Died for Your Sins (1973), and Gloria Anzaldúa’s Borderland/
La Frontera (1987). I will read it from a paradigm that is not reducible 
to the hegemony of Western thought from the Renaissance to today 
or anchored in Greece, Rome, and Jerusalem. This paradigm is “pluri-
versal”: it emerges from the histories of languages, epistemologies, and 
subjectivities that in the past five-hundred years had to deal with the 
expansive move of Western languages, epistemologies, and subjectivi-
ties (around which political theory and political economy have been 
imagined and implemented). It is the paradigm of decolonial thinking.
In relation to one of the questions asked during the Roundtable 
pointing toward my privileged situation at Duke University as a 
“white” person, I should say that I am in part renouncing my privileges. 
As a Third World (Argentinian) person of European descent (who is 
neither European nor Black nor Indian) who was trained through the 
reading of Greek, Latin, and modern European texts—in Argentina 
first and then in France—as if there was no other way of thinking 
than the way Europeans thought, I could embrace the marginal privi-
leges and (like Condoleeza Rice or Alberto Gonzalez) join the elite in 
power. However, while my training was forced upon me (I did not 
choose to be born in such and such a place or to study this and that in 
high school), now I am renouncing the imposed privileges. I am learn-
ing to unlearn. I prefer to start thinking based upon Waman Puma, 
Fanon, and Anzaldúa, instead of doing it with Aristotle or Plato, Kant 
or Bourdieu as my intellectual guides. I will then go the other way 
round. Thinking from Waman Puma, I will interpret Don Quixote, Kant, 
Marx, and Foucault. Decolonial thinking means, precisely, performing 
a decolonial shift: shifting from the imperial/colonial epistemology as 
well as from the internal imperial critiques by Las Casas, Cervantes, 
Marx, Foucault, and so on. Decolonial thinking is the freeing and the 
clearing of the coloniality of being, and that cannot be done from the 
perspective of Aristotle, Cervantes, Marx, etc. It has to be done from 
the perspective of people like Waman Puma, Fanon, and Anzaldúa. 
There is an irreducible difference between the diversity of imperial/
colonial thinking (usually referred to as Western thought) and decolo-
nial thinking. That difference is not cultural but colonial. It is indeed 
the colonial difference that, through racism, was built from the impe-
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rial perspective, and in which critical minds like Las Casas and Marx 
have been caught.
My references to Foucault, below, shall not be taken as a call to 
authority (Cervantes precisely taught us to question authority), but 
as a reference to someone whose opinions and arguments I respect. 
Foucault’s arguments are inscribed in the genealogy of Cervantes. It 
is not surprising that Foucault was able to read Cervantes in the way 
he did. Here I am attempting even to de-link Foucault and open up a 
new space, the freeing and the clearing of the coloniality of being that 
Waman Puma so masterfully blew up (and paid the price). I inscribe 
myself, then, in the decolonial paradigm, a paradigm of coexistence 
irreducible to the linear changes of epistemés (as Foucault had it). I am 
also referring to the emergence of the decolonial paradigm of coexis-
tence, a spatial epistemic break, and stating that this break was intro-
duced by Waman Puma. The insistence on coexistence means that it 
is irreducible to the chronological celebration of newness (e.g., a new 
episteme, a new paradigm) that characterizes the timeline, spatially 
restricted, of modern European imperial formations (once again, from 
Greece and Rome, from Greek and Latin to the Atlantic capitalist 
empires and to vernacular European imperial languages).
The decolonial shift is not a new paradigm, allow me to insist, but 
a paradigm-other that emerged from the spatial epistemic break in the 
sixteenth-century Spanish colonies and was rearticulated in British and 
French colonies in Africa and Asia since the nineteenth century. The 
decolonial shift means thinking from the colonial difference (not cul-
tural, but colonial); that is, from the space that imperial epistemology 
classified as the place of no-thinking, the place of the barbarians, the 
inferiors, the primitives who had to learn to think by studying Greek 
and Latin and modern European imperial languages. It is from that 
space, the space out-of-history, silenced, epistemically disavowed, that 
I intend to respectfully read Don Quixote.
*****
A set of narrative strategies anchored the ideological and aesthetic 
impact and enduring effect of Don Quixote. First is the consecration, 
by the end of the sixteenth and beginning of the seventeenth centu-
ries, of alphabetic literacy and its consequences for the composition of 
a complex and multilayered narrative. Second is the consecration of 
the printing press by the same period, reinforcing alphabetic literacy. 
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Vernacular languages emerging from Greek and Latin made possible 
the canonical works of “literature” (in general, as alphabetical written 
text in European imperial languages) that were recognized all over the 
non-European world thanks to the colonial expansion of European 
countries that produced substantial literary genius. Third, Don Quixote 
introduced various fractures with literary norms inherited from the 
European Middle Ages, particularly the rapid growth of alphabetic 
literacy around the twelfth century. Cervantes explicitly addressed 
several of these fractures in the preface to the first part of Don Quix-
ote. Fourth, Cervantes worked with the emergence of a new kind of 
readership, particularly the reader of “popular literature.” At that time 
in Spain people read chivalric romances. Cervantes published Don 
Quixote roughly one-hundred-and-forty years after the introduction of 
the printing press in Europe, which the prologue takes into account. 
Fifth, the fracture between fictional narratives (chivalric romance) and 
the daily life that Don Quixote confronts also structures the entire 
narrative, with Sancho Panza as a mediator between the two worlds. 
It disrupts the basic assumptions of a denotative philosophy of lan-
guage that has ruled the Greco-Roman and Christian politics of knowl-
edge ever since Plato. The disjunction between the fictional narratives 
embraced by Don Quixote and his everyday life is complemented and 
complicated by the mirror-effect of Don Quixote learning at the begin-
ning of the second part, when he is the reader of his own adventures. 
This particular fracture is indeed twofold. On the one hand, there is 
the fracture in enunciation that rejects the supra-subject constraints 
of “authority” (e.g., the refusal in the prologue to comply with the 
requirements of quotations, references, notes, etc., and at the same 
time, the affirmation of the sovereignty of a new subjectivity that was 
described as the modern subject). On the other hand, it contributes to 
the displacement of the hegemony of Theo-logical principles of knowl-
edge and reality toward a new politics of knowledge that I would 
describe as Ego-logical (e.g., secularization, the autonomy of reason, 
and the authority of the individual). It is this fracture, in all its com-
plexity within European history, that Michel Foucault picked up in his 
introduction to Les mots et les choses when he observes:
Don Quixote is the first modern work of literature, because in it we see the 
cruel reason of identities and differences make endless sport of signs and 
similitudes; because in it language breaks off its old kinship with things 
and enters into that lonely sovereignty from which it will reappear, in 
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its separated state, only as literature; because it marks the point where 
resemblance enters an age which is, from the point of view of resem-
blance, one of madness and imagination. Once similitude and signs are 
sundered from each other, two experiences can be established and two 
characters appear face to face.1
There is one particular instance of the concepts “two experiences” 
and “two characters” that I would like to push further. To do so, I 
need to de-link from the history and experiences of Western Chris-
tian and secular Europe and their corresponding conceptual struc-
tures and structure of feelings; that is, from a cosmology grounded 
in the languages and experiences of European men. Other histories 
and experiences whose conceptual structures and structure of feelings, 
grounded in language and experiences alien to European men, were 
silenced because they were considered inferior, from the perspective 
of European cosmologies. The imperial perspective was assumed to be 
the only valid one and therefore superior. To de-link means to make 
visible coexisting paradigms of thought that have been silenced and 
disavowed. I will read Don Quixote from paradigms of coexistence. 
Waman Puma de Ayala, in colonial Peru at the time of Cervantes, will 
show us the way.
However, we should remember an intermediary step taken indi-
rectly by Jorge Luis Borges and followed up by Michel Foucault. 
Borges, who wrote several pieces on Cervantes and Don Quixote, also 
wrote a piece on a certain Chinese encyclopedia in which the animal 
kingdom was classified in such a way that it made Foucault laugh. But 
it was precisely the fracture, the disruption of the classificatory logic 
invented by Borges and attributed to an imaginary Chinese encyclo-
pedia, that Foucault linked to the disruption of a naturalized concep-
tion of space produced by Velásquez in Las Meninas and by Cervantes 
in the second part of Don Quixote, when the character in the novel is 
able to read his own adventures, narrated in the first part, which had 
already been published. Foucault’s laugh and Borges’s classificatory 
“un-logic” may not be in the same epistemic space. Perhaps Foucault 
was not giving Borges full credit; or better yet, Foucault was not in the 
right conditions to perceive Borges’s decolonial shift. Perhaps Borges 
smiled at Foucault’s fresh naiveté and at the fact that while Cervantes 
and Foucault were fracturing from inside the logic of Western thought, 
Borges was playing a different game, a game that was closer to the 
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rules established by Waman Puma than by those established by Cer-
vantes and followed up by Foucault.
Don Quixote was published at the peak of drastic changes in Euro-
pean sensibilities and subjectivities. Ego-logy was taking over Theo-
logy, and the formation of the secular subject was displacing the 
formation of the religious subject. Secular philosophy was taking over 
the role of Theo-logical philosophy. The Theo-logical and Ego-logical 
politics of knowledge are the overarching epistemic frames that shaped 
political theory, political economy, aesthetics, and the entire domain of 
subjectivity, from racial and gender configurations to the very idea of 
“subject” itself. In other words, de-linking means to read Don Quixote, 
recognizing but not accepting the rules of the game in which Don Quix-
ote was written and has mainly been read until today. De-linking means 
to admire Don Quixote as an outsider, playing a different game marked 
by a diversity of “experiences”—not the experiences of the internal 
history of Europe, but those of the colonies where, for example, the 
primacy of alphabetic writing, the printing press, and the authority of 
colonial languages were more of a problem than a victory. The prob-
lem was that people without letters were described and evaluated as 
a people without history, and, of course, without literature.2 Foucault’s 
“two experiences” and “two characters” points to the fracture within 
European history and not to the fracture between Europe and the colo-
nized areas of the world since the sixteenth century (including today’s 
U.S. contribution to that long Western and capitalist imperial legacy). 
Borges de-linked. Foucault co-opted Borges within the mono-logic (in 
its internal diversity) of Western thought. Waman Puma most likely 
did not know Cervantes, but he knew that his way of thinking was 
not the same as that of Las Casas and other Spanish missionaries. 
Cervantes was critical of Western legacies. Las Casas was critical of 
Spanish conduct in the Indies. But Waman Puma introduced a way of 
thinking that was not grounded in Western legacies, unlike Las Casas 
and Cervantes. Waman Puma was facing Western memories while Las 
Casas and Cervantes were enduring them. For Borges, the Western leg-
acy was one among many (if, of course, the closest), and that explains 
the planetary dimension of his thoughts and narratives.
Since the European Renaissance, including its darker side (the “dis-
covery” of America), the dominant perspective on knowledge about 
the world and human societies was framed by Theology. The trivium 
and the quadrivium were the master models of understanding. Secu-
larization and the displacement from the Theo-logical to the Ego-logi-
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cal conceptualization of knowledge and understanding were advanced 
by Francis Bacon (Novum organum, 1620) and René Descartes (Dis-
cours de la méthode, 1636) in the first half of the seventeenth century. 
Together with Cervantes, who preceded both, they shifted the geogra-
phy of knowledge from Theology to a secular Philosophy and Science 
(grounded in Ego-logy) that is still in full force today. The postmodern 
critique of modernity (à la Foucault) primarily questions the authority 
of Theo- and Ego-logical macro-narratives and the homogeneity of the 
subject, but within the same rules imposed by the Theo-logical and 
Ego-logical politics of knowledge. It never attempted to de-link but, 
rather, to correct basic assumptions regarding totality and homogene-
ity that it displaced toward the singular and the fragments. In other 
words, the Theo-logical and Ego-logical politics of knowledge shaped 
what is generally understood as “modernity” and, consequently, what 
is understood to be “postmodernity.”
Why should one de-link instead of offering a new interpretation of 
Don Quixote that attempts to correct previous interpretations? Why 
not remain within the same logical and political game; that is, why not 
remain within the bubble of the Truman Show instead of moving away, 
de-linking like Waman Puma and Borges did? Cervantes himself offers 
the entry point to this need and possibility (although he himself fell 
short of his own intuition) by attributing the narrative of Don Quixote 
to Cide Hamete Benengeli. Thus, the original narrative was in Arabic, 
not in Spanish. The Spanish version published in 1605 is supposed 
to be a translation of the original narrative in Arabic. But things get 
more complicated. At the beginning of the second part, the discussion 
of the first part between the graduate from Salamanca, Don Quixote, 
and Sancho Panza about the translation into Spanish of the original in 
Arabic is no longer part of the original narrative. It looks like a narra-
tive by the translator, since the reader does not know to what extent 
the translator and Cide Hamete Benengeli worked together or knew 
each other. Foucault’s speculation on resemblances, similitude, and 
signs is disrupted by the entry of an alien character—the Arabic lan-
guage. There is, of course, a philosophical tradition in Arabic built on 
the translation of Greek philosophy. However, that tradition does not 
lead directly to Cervantes, Bacon, and Descartes. It leads to Ibn Sina 
(Avicenna) (Central Asia), al-Ghazali (Iran and Iraq), and Ibn Rushd 
(Averroes) (Andalucia and Morocco). History is not an ascending lin-
ear move from any origin to an only and unique present. Greco-Arabic 
philosophy coexists with Greco-Latin philosophy. It is only from a 
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Western perspective that reality may look like that. Not from Borges’s 
perspective, either. In a way, Cervantes himself is in part guilty of the 
sin. What is relevant here is that the original narrative is in Arabic and 
not in Latin. An original narrative in Latin would also have required a 
translation into Spanish. However, it would not have introduced the 
linguistic, theological, and philosophical fracture of a language like 
Arabic, which is linked to the Quran while Latin is linked to the Bible. 
Translation into Spanish from Arabic or Latin would always fulfill the 
function of consolidating the Castilian language, which Elio Antonio 
de Nebrija had formalized over a hundred years before, and aided by 
Bernardo José de Alderete, who wrote the first history of the language. 
However, Castilian is a language derived from Latin and inscribed in 
Greco-Latin memories. Arabic is not and was not. What are the impli-
cations (that Cervantes did not take to its logical conclusion) of pre-
senting Don Quixote as a narrative in Arabic written by a morisco?
There are no specific references or indications that Cide Hamete 
Benengeli was relying upon or dialoguing with the philosophical tra-
dition in Arabic (e.g., Ibn Khaldun, Ibn Sina, Ibn Rushd, al-Ghazali, 
and, of course, the Quran). Of particular interest would be Ibn Rushd 
(Averroes), who lived from 1126 to 1198. He, like Cervantes, was from 
Andalucia. One of Averroes’s main legacies was his defense of philoso-
phy against the attack of dogmatic theologians, arguing that there is 
not, nor should there be, an incompatibility between philosophy and 
religion. Or, he could have engaged with Averroes’s commentaries on 
Aristotle’s topics, rhetoric, and poetics.3 Instead, Cervantes, as a good 
man educated in Latin language and Greek-Latin legacies (instead 
of Greek-Arabic ones), focused on the conflicts between history and 
poetry.4 The good Sansón Carrasco, graduate of Salamanca (one of the 
first European universities of Christian and Latin foundation, 1255), 
discussed with Don Quixote and Sancho the narratives of the first part 
of the story by Cide Hamete Benengeli. He replies to Don Quixote’s 
complaints about certain parts of the veracity of the narrative by say-
ing:
[T]rue…but it is one thing to write as a poet and another to write as a 
historian: the poet can recount or sing about things not as they were, but 
as they should have been, and the historian must write about them not 
as they should have been, but as they were, without adding or subtract-
ing anything from the truth (Edith Grossman translation, p. 476).
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It is not clear if this chapter is part of the original narrative by Cide 
Hamete Benengeli or a translator intervention. However, the dilemma 
of writing poetry or history was not an Arabic legacy in which, sup-
posedly, Cide Hamete Benengeli was inscribed. Or was he just writing 
in Arabic but with a Greco-Latin memory? Was Cide Hamete Benegeli 
a sort of Inca Garcilaso de la Vega upside down, who was also writing 
in Spanish in Andalucia at the beginning of the seventeenth century, 
although inscribing Inca memories in his narrative? We know why 
Inca Garcilaso inscribed Inca memories in Castilian languages, but we 
do not have any idea of why Cide Hamete Benengeli would write in 
Arabic to erase memories inscribed in Arabic language.
The distinction between history and poetry introduced by Carrasco 
was by no means universal, although it is assumed and presented 
as such in Don Quixote. Thus, the fact that the original narration is 
authored by Cide Hamete Benengeli is either a superficial curios-
ity, since the categories of thought in the Arabic language are totally 
absent, or it is a blatant act of colonization, since Cide Hamete Benen-
geli seems to be, like Cervantes, someone who is inscribed in the Latin 
and Christian tradition. Recognizing this simple fact brings to the fore-
ground what is absent and silenced: the differential theoretical issues 
inscribed in other languages and memories (Arabic in this case, but 
also Chinese, Bengali, Aymara, Urdu, etc.).
Let’s take one example of rationality outside of European assump-
tions about reason. The story that follows was told by German writer 
Peter Bischel.
A young Balinese became my primary teacher. One day I asked him 
if he believed that the history of Prince Rama—one of the holy books of 
the Hindus—is true.
Without hesitation, he answered it with “Yes.”
So you believe that the Prince Rama lived somewhere and some-
when?
I do not know if he lived, he said.
Then it is a story?
Yes, it is a story.
Then someone wrote this story—I mean: a human being wrote it? I 
answered and felt triumphant, when I thought I had convinced him.
But he said: It is quite possible that somebody invented this story. But true 
it is, in any case.
Then—I replied—it is the case that Prince Rama did not live on this 
earth?
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What is it that you want to know?, he asked. Do you want to know 
whether the story is true, or merely whether it occurred?5
I can imagine that Sansón Carrasco, graduate of Salamanca (equiva-
lent to graduating from Harvard today), would have dismissed the 
young Balinese teacher as someone still living in the mountains, discon-
nected from civilization. I can imagine that the young Balinese teacher 
(in the twenty-first century) would consider any Sansón Carrasco of 
our day irrational. “What is with these people who cannot distinguish 
what is true from what happened?,” he would most likely ask. We are 
here in the terrain of de-linking; that is, putting hegemonic naturalized 
belief (in Christianity as well as in secular sciences and Western phi-
losophy—remember, the Greek-Latin tradition translated into mod-
ern/imperial European languages) in its regional and partial place.
Conceptual de-linking begins by seeing through the assumptions 
that the world is what my indoctrinated perspective says it is, and that 
any other perspective either doesn’t exist or, if it does, is dangerous 
because it is different. It consists in thinking (a) from the absent perspec-
tives and (b) in critical perspective to the philosophical assumptions 
that cast them (absent perspectives) as absent. Translate epistemology 
into racism and you will understand what I am referring to: people 
of color are absences and silences or, in the best possible world, rec-
ognized as “minorities.” To assume that the ways in which truth and 
fiction were conceived in modern Europe (like Sansón Carrasco does) 
were universally valid may have disastrous consequences. A century 
after the expulsion of the Moors from the Iberian Peninsula, Cervantes 
was certainly aware of the confrontations between Latin and Arabic, 
and Christianity and Islam. The century of Christian and Castilian 
expansion (a century reigned by Charles V and Philip II) was success-
ful in reducing to absence or silence everything that was not Western 
Christian and inscribed in the Greco-Roman tradition, a self-appointed 
supremacy that was supported by the economic success of mercantile 
capitalism.
Four hundred years after the publication of Don Quixote we should 
celebrate it as a European contribution to the achievements of human 
creativity and philosophical insights. However, in light of more than 
fifty years of the second wave of decolonization and the increasing 
numbers and characters of social movements contesting neoliberal glo-
balization and proposing another globalization (which is indeed tak-
ing place around the world by intellectual and social movements that 
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are de-linking from the totalitarian economic and neoliberal designs, 
implementations, and narratives of its “beneficial” consequences), we 
have the responsibility to bring to the foreground the silences and the 
absences that both literary critics and historians reproduce in the name 
of Don Quixote’s literary values as a monument of Spanish national his-
tory or a monument of Western civilization. In this context, Cervantes’s 
political move should precede the attention that has been devoted to 
the structure of the novel itself. Here, I am trying to follow Cervantes’s 
teaching and ask what would be the twenty-first century equivalent of 
what Cervantes did at the beginning of the seventeenth? I see two pos-
sible answers to this question. One would be the postmodern answer, 
inscribed in the same European history of Cervantes and Don Quix-
ote, which questions the very principles of modernity that Cervantes 
contributed so much to install in the transition from the Theo- to the 
Ego-politics of knowledge and understanding. This was precisely Fou-
cault’s insight in his prologue to Les mots et les choses. The other answer 
would be decolonial rather than postcolonial in nature. The decolonial 
carries more weight than the postcolonial in the sense that decoloniza-
tion of knowledge and being is a step that is not always clear in post-
colonial talks, oriented more to solving problems in the academy than 
in the world. Gandhi, Fanon, Césaire, Garvey, Du Bois, and Anzaldúa, 
among others, are clear examples of a decolonial critique pointing 
toward decolonization. Decolonization of knowledge and being are 
two particular kinds of de-linking. The question is then to read Don 
Quixote today from the conceptual frame introduced by these thinkers 
and activists.
To celebrate Don Quixote without bringing into the debate, simul-
taneously, the need to de-link and decolonize knowledge and being 
would contribute very little to the critical insights and dissenting argu-
ments that Cervantes himself construed through his master narra-
tive. Such mechanisms of power are very well known, and historical 
examples abound. The case of Patrice Lumumba comes to mind. After 
the forces of order killed him and chopped his body into pieces, they 
celebrated him as a national hero of independence. Thus, the first point 
in re-reading Don Quixote is to uncouple the myth and the danger of 
making the novel a sacred object when Don Quixote was written pre-
cisely against subjectivities formed by sacred beliefs and for subjectivi-
ties formed by the emancipation of the secular subject, as Immanuel 
Kant would have it almost two hundred years after Don Quixote. Don 
Quixote is one of many expressions of a process in which the sover-
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eignty of the subject takes center stage instead of the subjection of the 
subject to the dictates of God.6
To read Don Quixote today, and to follow the teaching of Cervantes 
in writing it (that is, his contribution to the formation of a new Euro-
pean subjectivity—the modern sovereign subject), means to be aware 
of the particular junction between Cervantes’s and the reader’s horizon 
of expectations. When one hundred copies of Don Quixote were dis-
tributed in the Spanish colonies of the New World, it is easy to guess 
why Indians and African slaves paid little attention to it.7 It is also easy 
to guess that Spanish and Creole elites in their New World colonies 
ignored this fact because Indians and African slaves were outside the 
horizon of the civilized expectations of this Castilian elite. This is pre-
cisely the moment in which de-linking is required and decolonization 
of knowledge and of being needs to be put into motion. Don Quixote 
in all its marvelous condensation of several cultural codes of late six-
teenth- and early seventeenth-century Europe cannot be taken as a 
direction and point of arrival for Indians and African slaves. Indians 
and Afro-slaves have the same right to ignore Cervantes and Don Quix-
ote that Cervantes, as well as his contemporary and present readers, 
have had in ignoring Indians and Africans. A similar argument can be 
made with respect to Arabic language and the world of Islamic faith 
both at the time of Cervantes and in subsequent and current interpre-
tations of the novel. At this point, I do not have specific information 
regarding whether or when Don Quixote was translated into Arabic. 
It should be noted, however, that Arab speakers and Islamic believers 
had the same right to ignore Don Quixote as Cervantes had to ignore 
the magnificent legacies of Arabic thoughts, in spite of the fact that 
the original narrator of Don Quixote’s adventures was Cide Hamete 
Benengeli.
My re-reading of Don Quixote starts, therefore, from the spatial epis-
temic fracture brought about by the original moment of modernity in 
which the triumph of Christianity ensures a Western Christian and 
later a European legacy grounded in Greek and Latin languages and 
thoughts; that is, from the moment that the foundation of modern/colo-
nial designs in the New World engendered the predictable reaction by 
those who were not happy to be told what to do. Decolonial thinking, 
like in Waman Puma de Ayala, is the moment of the epistemic fracture 
that Western Christianity (and later on, the Civilizing Mission, Devel-
opment, and Market Democracy) engendered and nourished. The 
Middle East today is one example of that trajectory. Modernity/colo-
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niality is detrimental to the Arabic and Islamic worlds as well as to the 
languages and religions of indigenous people in the New World and 
Africa. By de-linking I mean precisely this: to read Don Quixote today 
from the horizon of expectations of individuals and populations for 
whom literacy and alphabetic writing did not mean what it meant for 
Europeans (as theorized by Elio Antonio de Nebrija) and for whom the 
question of authority and the subject in the transition from a Theo- to 
an Ego-politics of knowledge and understanding (including aesthetics, 
of course) was not really a problem. In other words, I am not saying 
that it was bad or wrong to move from a Theo- to an Ego-politics of 
knowledge and understanding in Europe (as we see it in Cervantes, 
Bacon, and Descartes). That is what European men of the time needed 
and I have no quarrel with it. What I am questioning is the universality 
of such a moment of transition and, consequently, the fact that it has 
been taken as a reference point for global history. Arabic and Islamic 
people, as well as Indians and Africans, did not have the problem of 
emancipating themselves from the Theo-politics of knowledge and 
understanding or working toward an emancipated subject as the foun-
dation of the second stage of “modernity,” grounded in Ego-politics, 
which then defends and promotes the sovereignty of the subject and 
the secular concept of reason. Indians and Africans in the New World 
at the beginning of the seventeenth century were not in need of assert-
ing the sovereignty of the subject and detaching it from the authority 
of the past. Instead, Indians and Africans needed to decolonize the sub-
ject that was colonized under both the Theo-logical and the Ego-logical 
European foundation of knowledge and understanding. Waman Puma 
de Ayala introduced a spatial epistemic break and one of the first con-
tributions to the politics of de-linking. But, of course, it was ignored 
and silenced subsequently, until his manuscript was rediscovered in 
1936. I will come back to the issue of the spatial epistemic break as a 
crucial strategy of de-linking.
Today “we” (and I would suggest that this “we” has some global, 
not universal, implication that I will soon explain) are facing a critical 
moment of theoretical and political affirmation of the colonial/modern 
subject. The colonial/modern subject is not a new one. It can be traced 
back to the sixteenth century, precisely to the Spanish colonies of the 
New World. The colonial subject (e.g., Indians and Africans “adapting” 
to the colonial situations created by modernity, as well as the Moors 
who were victims of the triumph of Christianity in the sixteenth cen-
tury—and will be colonized by England and France in the nineteenth 
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century) was not agonizing to emancipate from a concept of authority 
that was linked to Theology and Latin. Ever since the sixteenth cen-
tury, the modern/colonial subject was learning that it needed to be 
liberated from the domination and supremacy of both the Theological 
authority and the Ego-logical sovereign subject that Cervantes, Bacon, 
and Descartes were promoting as emancipation.
De-linking not only means to detach oneself from the rules of the 
game imposed by the hegemony of European Theo- and Ego-logical 
politics of knowledge/understanding. It also means bringing into exis-
tence new and distinct politics of knowledge/understanding. The hege-
mony of concept and principles of knowledge established in Europe 
since the Renaissance and through the Enlightenment (in its Theo- and 
Ego-logical forms as the foundation of European modernity and post-
modernity) created the conditions for what in the twentieth century 
could be formulated as the “Geo-graphic” and “Bio-graphic”8 politics 
of knowledge and understanding.
While Theo- and Ego-politics of knowledge have been hegemonic 
both in their dominance as well as in their internal dissenting domi-
nance—e.g., Marxism that projected a global emancipation based on 
the model of the European proletariat that emerged with the Indus-
trial Revolution—the Geo- and Bio-graphic politics of knowledge and 
understanding brought new rules into the game, not only new play-
ers. It created, first of all, the spatial epistemic break that cannot be 
subsumed under the temporal epistemological breaks (Foucault), par-
adigmatic changes (Kuhn), or the emergence of the modern subject 
(Giddens). Secondly, it introduced epistemic principles tangentially 
related (because of the expanding logic of coloniality after the conquest 
and colonization of the New World) to Greek and Latin and more 
directly related to categories of thought, memories, and social and 
economic practices of non-European and imperial languages and his-
tories (e.g., Arabic, Aymara, Hindi, Bengali, etc.). Thirdly, it revealed 
the color of epistemology since Geo- and Body-politics of knowledge 
were the responses from categories of thought founded in languages 
and experiences of people of color (Waman Puma, Fanon, Gandhi) 
and non-hegemonic sexual preferences (Anzaldúa). In other words, 
the emergence of an epistemology grounded in colonial histories and 
experiences of people of color and queers revealed that the Theo- and 
Ego-politics of knowledge were rules established by white European 
men. Finally, this “newness,” being spatial, cannot be subsumed under 
the ideology of newness as a temporal justification of progress and of 
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modernity as a point of arrival. Thus, it is not by chance that the Geo-
politics of knowledge/understanding was articulated as such during 
the Cold War, and not in Europe but in the periphery—in the Third 
World by intellectuals of European descent (the case of Borges, but also 
of Dussel). The Body-politics of knowledge/understanding was articu-
lated as such also during the Cold War, as a growing consciousness 
among people of color, women, and people of non-hegemonic sexual 
preferences. In both cases, the right to know implied the necessary de-link-
ing with the masculine, Christian, and white assumptions that founded the 
Theo- and Ego-logical politics of knowledge/understanding. De-linking and 
decolonization of knowledge go hand in hand. Consequently, reading 
Don Quixote today from the perspective of the Geo- and Bio-graphic 
politics of knowledge/understanding means to recognize, on the one 
hand, the enormous importance of the book in the European transition 
from the Theo- to the Ego-frames of knowledge and subjectivities. On 
the other hand, it implies the need to reveal the silences and absences 
of its horizons of expectation in which most of its critics and commen-
tators (including Foucault) were caught.
Waman Puma de Ayala is one of many examples of the emergence 
of the Geo- and Bio-politics of knowledge but, above all, he is a clear 
example of de-linking.9 In contradistinction to Cervantes, Waman 
Puma and the colonies were not concerned with the transition from the 
Theo- to the Ego-logical subject. Waman Puma was, literally, in a dif-
ferent place and in a different skin, although at the same global time as 
Cervantes. Waman Puma did not have to be concerned with the theo-
logical and textual authorities that Cervantes so masterfully explains 
in the preface of Don Quixote. Waman Puma was of Cervantes’s genera-
tion but he was an Indian living in the Viceroyalty of Peru. He was con-
cerned with the transformations of the subjects in the Incanate under 
colonial rule and with the transformation of subjectivities as a conse-
quence of the colonization of knowledge. The celebration of alphabetic 
literacy was not in his mind. What he had in mind was the Kipuka-
mayoc [Fig. 1], and how the Kipukamayoc under colonial rule and the 
colonization of knowledge were transformed into the Kilkaykamayoc. 
In other words, the Kilkaycamayoc is closer to the paradigm of the 
literate subject [Fig. 2]. The Kilkaymamayoc has ink, pen, and a table 
(instead of a set of knotted strings called Kipus) as an extension of its 
hand [Fig. 3]. The materiality of writing in the transformation of the 
colonial subject has transformed the Amauta into someone different: a 
social role between Amauta and Philosopher; that is, between someone 
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Figure 1. The quipu, like any other writing system, was a good tool in 
the hands of the philosophers as well as the accountants for keeping 
track of goods in the stores of the Inca, the head of Tawantinsuyu. Kip-
ucamayoc (or quipucamayoc) was the name given to accountants, those 
who were skillful in the use of the quipu. (From Guaman Poma, Neuva 
corónica y buen govierno, completed circa 1610. Facsimile edition by John 
Murra and Rolena Adorno, Mexico City: Siglo Ventiuno, 1982.)
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Figure 2. Albrecht Dürer, Erasmus of Rotterdam, 1526, engraving, Hood 
Museum of Art, Dartmouth College, Hanover, New Hampshire.
Macalester International  Vol. 17
22
Figure 3. The quipucamayoc became the quilcaycamayoc, since quilcay 
was the name invented in the Quechua language to name the Spanish 
writing system. In this plate we see the transformation of the quipuca-
mayoc into the quilcaycamayoc, a good portrait of what could have been 
the kind of double consciousness experimented with (in different ways 
and to different degrees) by the people of the Inca Empire. (From Gua-
man Poma, Neuva corónica y buen govierno, completed circa 1610. Fac-




whose practice is to “read the signs of the world” [Fig. 4] into someone 
who “loves wisdom,” according to the Greek tradition translated into 
European imperial and modern languages. Finally, the imperial colo-
nialization of knowledge/being implanted the very idea of “author” 
(el autor camina) [Fig. 5] into Quechua and Aymara categories of thought. 
“The autor camina” (which is the title of Fig. 5) is a transformation paral-
lel to the transformation of the Kipukamayoc into the Kilkaykamayoc. 
“The author” in this case is no longer the modern-subject (embodied 
in and by Cervantes) but the colonial-subject (embodied in and by 
Waman Puma). The colonial subject, that is, the coloniality of being, is 
the condition from which decolonial thinking emerges; the need to free 
and clear the coloniality of being. Still in other words, Waman Puma, 
contrary to the emancipated modern-subject (Cervantes’s subject and 
author), is a subject twice colonized: in its knowledge and in its being. 
And this happened, remember, in a world coexisting with Cervantes 
writing the novel and with the Spanish elites reading Don Quixote in 
the New World, as Irving Leonard registered in his classic study The 
Books of the Braves.10
At the beginning of the seventeenth century, readers were from aris-
tocratic stock and wealthy pockets of the population. Leonard reports 
that in the New World the reading sector of the society preferred bulky 
novels, poetry, and ecclesiastical literature. The book trade itself was 
highly profitable in the colonies. Pietistic and theological writings 
were, of course, the stock and trade for booksellers, although 15% of 
book shipments were miscellaneous secular works. Who among the 
publishers in Spain and the New World and the Spanish reader of aris-
tocratic stock would pay attention to what Waman Puma wrote? It was 
not the fault of Cervantes, of course. Most likely if they had met, one 
can imagine that Cervantes and Waman Puma could have been bud-
dies, comrades, and teammates.
Waman Puma’s work questions authority in a different epistemic 
mode than Cervantes. Nueva corónica could hardly have been composed 
by a Spaniard for the simple reason that it would have been a miracle 
if a Spaniard could have located himself in the place and skin of an 
Indian who enjoyed both the knowledge and subjectivity of his family 
and Indian ancestors and the subjectivity imposed by Spanish institu-
tions and the Spaniards’ own ancestry. After Waman Puma was widely 
recognized (thanks to the editions of John Murra and Rolena Adorno 
as well as that of Franklin Peace), only a conservative Eurocentric mind 
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Figure 4. Guaman Poma’s description of the astrólogo (amauta or phi-
losopher) in an Inca cosmological setting, with the sun and the moon, 
the masculine and the feminine, as complementary opposites. He also 
carries a string of quipus, implement of the Inca writing system, within 
the same logic of the ceque system (Guaman Poma, Neuva corónica y 
buen govierno). The drawing reveals the coexistence, as in “El Pontifi-
cial Mundo,’’ of Spanish and Inca concepts of representation. This is a 
good example of what Serge Gruzinski analyzes as “mestizo thinking” 




Figure 5. The astrólogo (amauta or philosopher) has been converted, by 
colonization, into an author. This plate is captioned “Camina el autor” 
(the author is walking). While the amauta carried quipus in his hands, 
the author carries a rosary. Furthermore, the author is being followed 
by a horse, a companion that was unavailable to the amauta. (From 
Guaman Poma, Neuva corónica y buen govierno, completed circa 1610. 
Facsimile edition by John Murra and Rolena Adorno, Mexico City: 
Siglo Ventiuno, 1982.)
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could have come out with the idea that if the Nueva corónica deserves 
attention, then it could not have been composed by an Indian!
Of course, it was not Cervantes’s responsibility to be concerned with 
Waman Puma’s situation. It would have been difficult if not impos-
sible for Cervantes to know about Waman Puma. But once again, those 
who surrounded Cervantes (the Church, the Court, the publishers who 
were making money with Don Quixote) were not interested in the prob-
lems that the colonial subjects were facing, since as colonial subjects, 
they were not considered human, intelligent, or creative enough to be 
taken into account. Nueva corónica y buen gobierno was systematically 
silenced until 1936, when a scholar discovered the manuscript in the 
National Library of Copenhagen. However, the Church, the Crown, 
and the publisher all supported the envoy of hundreds of copies of 
Don Quixote to the colonies. Who was reading the book? It was not the 
Indians or the African slaves, but the Spanish Creole population and 
perhaps Mestizos (mixed blood, by pure white epistemology) of Span-
ish ideological descent.
The clearest example of de-linking and therefore shifting towards 
a Geo- and Bio-politics of knowledge and understanding appears in 
Waman Puma’s dialogue with the Dominicans (Domingo de Santo 
Tomas, Las Casas, Vitoria). This is how the strategy works. Waman 
Puma used Las Casas’s critique of the abuse of the Indians by the 
Spaniards. But, of course, he did not support Las Casas’s project of 
evangelization. At this point, Waman Puma’s argument was no longer 
based on Las Casas’s Greek and Latin written tradition and author-
ity, but rather on the oral tradition of Aymara and Quechua. Waman 
Puma advanced an argument that was both an alternative to the just war 
advocated by Ginés de Sepúlveda and an alternative to peaceful evangelization 
advocated by Las Casas. Waman Puma was able to perform a conceptual 
de-linking (and set the stage for a future decolonization of being) by 
de-linking from the tyranny of written Greek and Latin authority and 
tradition, and by bringing into the game the conceptual framework of 
the authority and tradition orally inscribed in Aymara and Quechua. 
De-linking implies border thinking and border epistemology, which 
is clearly the outcome of Waman Puma’s Nueva corónica. Thus, while 
Cervantes was contributing to a chronological epistemic break that 
Foucault clearly articulated and celebrated, Waman Puma contributed 
to a spatial epistemic break, to border thinking, and to the decoloniza-
tion of knowledge and of being, despite the many people who reduced 




Thus, the introduction of the colonies (co-existing with but invisible 
as history from the partial European experience) translated into total 
European abstract universals at the turn of the seventeenth century. 
This allows us to take a new look at some of the theories of the novel. 
Lukacs, for example, sees Don Quixote as the first great novel of world 
literature. He links this event to the time of crisis and transition when 
“the Christian God began to forsake the world,” a time of “the demons 
let loose, a period of great confusion of values in the minds of an as yet 
unchanged value system. And Cervantes, the faithful Christian and 
naively loyal patriot, creatively exposed the deepest essence of this 
demonic problem: the purest heroism is bound to become grotesque; 
the strongest faith is bound to become madness, when the ways lead-
ing to the transcendental home have become impossible.”12 Anthony 
Cascardi, who distinguished himself for his analysis of the Spanish 
Golden Age in the frame of European modernity, explores the mean-
ing of secularization in Don Quixote. Cascardi links secularization to 
a transition from the Middle Ages to “modernity.” He attempts a re-
reading of Lukacs’s idealistic language in the Theory of the Novel from 
the materialistic perspective that Lukacs introduced in his History and 
Class Consciousness. Cascardi’s thesis is the following:
I follow up Lukacs’s lead in arguing that the origins of literary moder-
nity as reflected in Cervantes work may indeed be understood in terms 
of the process of secularisation, but that we must regard ‘secularisation’ 
not just as the result of a change in the patterns of religious belief but as 
a master-trope for the problem of authority as it is figured within literary 
history. At the same time I suggest that the process of secularisation is 
not anything happening in culture external to literature, but that liter-
ary history itself, as an effort to negotiate between the authorities of the 
present and those of the past, is the best example of the ‘secularisation’ 
process whose consequences Lukacs is attempting to express.13
In both Lukacs’s and Cascardi’s works, “literary modernity” and 
“secularization processes and modernity” are considered European 
phenomena. In this regard, Don Quixote would be the secular equiva-
lent (since secularization is conceived as taking place in Europe during 
the transition from the Renaissance to the Enlightenment) of sacred 
texts like the Torah, the Bible, the Bhagavad Gita, The Book of Changes, 
and many others codified and transmitted in oral forms (e.g., Mexican 
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expression for la flor y el canto, la tinta negra y la tinta roja, or many of 
the African examples studied by missionaries and anthropologists). In 
this regard, modernity is nothing more than a particular time-space 
period in which a new concentration of forces took place. However, 
the problem is that secularization and modernity are much more than 
simple temporal and spatial markers. They are “keywords” of new 
forms of life and social organization that became a point of reference 
and arrival, and that went together with the process of globalization 
that began in the sixteenth century. This “beginning” of globalization 
was not, of course, defined by the general tendencies of human beings 
to use their legs and arms (and their technological extensions, such as 
tools, to dominate nature, to devastate the enemy in war, or to protect 
themselves from intemperate climates, etc.) to move around the globe 
populating it at will. Globalization thus conceived complements and 
grounds the hegemony of universal history while it makes invisible global 
histories that cannot be subsumed under one origin which is at the same time 
uni-versal—that is, the belief that there is “one general beginning”14 and 
an ascending order toward the final judgment in the Bible, or under the 
completion of the project of modernity (in the secular version summa-
rized by Habermas). The process of globalization that I am discussing 
has a different beginning and a different perspective on the beginning: 
it begins with the emergence of decolonial thinking and it carries the 
decolonial perspective into the interpretation of global processes. That 
is to say, it looks at the world from the perspective of global coloniality 
instead of the perspective of global modernity. It is from this different 
frame that I am trying to connect Don Quixote to global coloniality, and 
to de-link from the hegemony of a universal history that was and con-
tinues to be told from the sacred perspective of the Bible, the secular 
perspective of Hegel and Marx, and the neoliberal perspective of Hun-
tington and Bhagwati.
Based on Cervantes’s preface to Don Quixote, Cascardi rightly under-
scores the question of authority linked to the process of secularization 
and to modernity. As is well known, Cervantes made a strong point in 
rejecting the tyranny and authority of the past. By doing so, he enforced 
the authority of the individual and of the author. The dialogue with 
Cervantes’s friend, or alter-ego, reinforces in a parody—cutting links 
with the past—the servitude to the authority of the past and the free-
dom of the authority of Cervantes. It reveals the modern subject: “you 
don’t need me to swear dear that I longed for this book, born out of my 
own brain.” The first sentence of the prologue is as memorable as the 
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first sentence of the narrative, “En un lugar de La Mancha.” The problem 
of authority as affirmation of the subject (which has a philosophical 
formulation thirty years later in Descartes’s famous, “I think, therefore 
I am”) thus formulated was strictly a European problem.15
Almost one hundred years before Cervantes and Bacon, Spanish 
chronicler Gonzálo Fernández de Oviedo was confronted with the 
problem of writing about the “Indies” (Sumario de la natural y general 
historia de las Indias, 1526). Facing a new “reality” that was unknown to 
and undescribed by the classical authority that Oviedo could read, and 
oblivious to the fact that this reality was known and described by the 
people inhabiting the Caribbean and the continent, Oviedo decided 
to affirm his own authority. In doing so, he disqualified the Greco-
Roman authorities on the same ground, but he never thought that the 
people inhabiting the Caribbean also had their own thoughts about the 
experience. Oviedo was living as a Spaniard, educated in Italy in the 
Greco-Latin tradition, and confronting people that he most likely did 
not consider to be human. Indigenous knowledge in the New World 
(equivalent to indigenous knowledge in Europe or in Africa) was not 
recognized. Fernández de Oviedo was contributing to the authority of 
experience and the sovereignty of the observing subject, not of books 
and classical authors. He was still under the general frame of the Theo-
politics of knowledge, as Jose de Acosta would be about seventy years 
after Oviedo,16 but already moving to the Ego-logical principles of 
knowledge and the shaping of subjectivities.
The major lesson here is that while in Europe the affirmation of the 
subject was celebrated in an ascending process of emancipation from 
the Theo-political epistemic frame and toward building the Ego-politi-
cal frame (to wit, Cervantes’s critical reflections on authority and Des-
cartes’s critical reflections on thought and subject), in the colonies the 
new subjectivity consisted not in the sovereignty of being but in the colo-
niality of being, in the devaluation and expendability of human lives by 
expropriating lands, racializing people to exploit their labor (mainly in 
encomiendas and plantations), and depriving them of their own knowl-
edge. The extirpation of idolatry, at its height in the final decades of 
the sixteenth and early decades of the seventeenth centuries, was the 
counter-face and hidden side of the Theo-logical authority as well as 
the Ego-logical affirmation of self. We will have to wait more than 450 
years until the consequences of the coloniality of being surfaces to the 
level of decolonization of being and liberation similar to the European 
emancipation of the sovereignty of being, to which Cervantes’s literary and 
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Descartes’s philosophical reflections contributed. Thus, while celebrat-
ing Cervantes’s contribution to the European sovereignty of being, we 
cannot be oblivious to two simultaneous historical processes in the 
colonies. On the one hand, they consisted of the Christian and Euro-
pean (and lately the U.S.) colonization of beings by the implementation 
of global designs under the name of Christian and civilizing missions, 
development and modernization, market and democracy. On the other 
hand, they consisted of the dissenting processes of the decolonization of 
being that emerged as the critical consciousness of Indian and African 
populations in America in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, 
and that re-emerged all over the world with the reproduction of global 
coloniality enacted by liberal and capitalist imperial countries (Eng-
land, France, and the U.S.).
The decolonization of being, which had been coming of age in the 
twentieth century mainly through dispersed work around the world,17 
is the equivalent of Cervantes, Bacon, and Descartes in seventeenth-
century Europe. The decolonization of being is the liberation from the 
dominance of the Eurocentered Theo- and Ego-politics of being and 
knowledge. It is simultaneously the affirmation of the Geo- and Bio-
politics of knowledge and being. Liberation and decolonization mean 
moving out of the logical and philosophical game to which Cervantes 
and Descartes contributed so much. For that reason, the meaning of 
Don Quixote, globally and from the perspective of the coloniality of 
being and colonized subjectivities, is not necessarily a cause for joy and 
celebration. While no one will question the achievements of Cervantes 
and Descartes, recognition complements distance and critical change 
of terrain in the reading of the “masterpieces” of the modern/colonial 
world. These masterpieces are all, willingly or not, implicated in two 
simultaneous sets of processes:
•  the celebration of the emerging modern subject, the instauration of 
a supreme Ego-logical frame of mind that displaced (not replaced 
or erased) the Theo-logical one, and
•  the silencing of a newly emerging colonial subject and the devalu-
ation of lives that did not correspond to the dominant Eurocen-
tered values in philosophy and literature. The instauration of the 
coloniality of being that, almost five hundred years later, follows 
the example of Cervantes and Descartes by working toward the 
decolonization of being in the same way that Cervantes and Des-
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cartes worked toward the emancipation of the modern subject in 
the internal history of Europe.
*****
Most, if not all, readings of Don Quixote remained within the West-
ern and Greco-Roman world. The readings that I referenced in my 
argument are those that linked Don Quixote with modernity and 
with the emergence of the sovereign modern subject. I brought to the 
foreground the emergence of the decolonial subject in the work of 
Waman Puma de Ayala in colonial Peru. This underlined the fact that 
the canonical readings of Cervantes contributed to silencing the spa-
tial epistemic breaks emerging in the colonies, epistemic breaks that 
consisted of de-linking from the tyranny of Western civilization by 
proposing to play the game with different rules, and denouncing the 
incredible credulity of Spaniards and Christians (and subsequently the 
hegemonic culture of Western Europe and the U.S.) for believing that 
the sovereignty of the European subject was of universal value and 
that everybody else on the planet had to bend to the dictates of West-
ern categories of thought.18
Globalization could be interpreted and narrated (that is to say, 
globalization more than an ontological and historical process is an 
interpretation of socio-historical processes that do not have a name 
inscribed in themselves) by considering only the local histories of 
imperial global designs; that is, of what is said, planned, and enacted 
by persons and institutions that are in a position to enforce their view 
of life and society. It could also be interpreted and narrated by consid-
ering the local histories that bend to imperial forces or decolonial local 
histories that, like the World Social Forum, propose another global-
ization. De-linking is perhaps the most radical move and imperative 
toward an alternative globalization that should be enacted at every 
level in the sphere of human activity. My argument here consists of a 
simple example of what de-linking may look like and in what direction 
it should go in the domain of knowledge and understanding. Anniver-
saries of masterpieces of genial authors could be maintained if society 
considers them necessary. At this point, however, they should be read 
from the perspective of projects oriented toward the decolonization of 
knowledge and being.
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*****
A final remark: in the dialogue that followed my presentation and dur-
ing the Roundtable the next day with Mary Gossy and Frederick de 
Armas, Dean Ahmed I. Samatar presented as a plea to me the need to 
make clear that not everything is bad in the West and not everything 
is good in the Rest. Certainly, I cannot agree more. Yet obviously my 
argument had left the impression that I was condemning the West 
and glorifying the Rest. My belief in this respect is that there is no safe 
place. Christianity can be totalitarian and liberating. Liberalism can be 
totalitarian and liberating. Marxism can be totalitarian and liberating. 
Islam can be totalitarian and liberating. Being Black or Latino is not a 
guarantee of being progressive. Being gay or lesbian is not a guarantee 
of being democratic.
Yet there is a totalitarian and imperial bent in the constitution of 
the West, and I do not have any doubt about it. That same imperial 
and totalitarian bent contributed to engendering the same situation 
in the ex-colonies after liberation. Many African countries are a prime 
example. In Latin America after the Cold War we have also seen a suc-
cession of totalitarian regimes supported by the United States. Saddam 
Hussein is not the result of totalitarian tendencies in Islam, but of the 
complicity of colonial with totalitarian regimes in the West (Western 
liberal and Russian communist imperialisms).
Because there is no safe place, we can think about Samatar’s rightly 
cautionary note in the following terms. While in Europe in 1955, Mar-
tinican intellectual and public figure Aimé Césaire observed the strik-
ing co-relation between colonialism and Hitler. It would be worthwhile, 
said Césaire, to study clinically and in detail, step by step, how Hitler 
“applied to Europe colonialist procedures which until then had been 
reserved exclusively for the Arabs of Algeria, the ‘coolies’ of India and 
the ‘niggers’ of Africa.”19
Not surprisingly, but independently from Césaire, Canan Makiya 
published in 1989, under the pseudonym of Samir al-Khalil, a book 
titled Republic of Fear.20 You can imagine both contexts: Césaire writing 
shortly after WWII and Makiya shortly before the Gulf War. Saddam 
Hussein had been in power for some time by 1989. Makiya dissected 
the character of Hussein and concluded that his regime was modelled 
upon European totalitarian movements: the Nazis, fascists, and com-
munists. The picture is clear. There is a curved line that goes from 
regimes of violence in the European colonies to regimes of violence in 
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Europe itself, and back to the Third World, as models for regimes such 
as Saddam Hussein’s. The darker side of modernity is what unites the 
West with the Rest in regimes of violence. We only hope that decolo-
niality will bring about lines of peace and liberation, moving back and 
forth from ex-colonies and beyond to end the imperial complicities 
between the European Union, the U.S., Japan, and Israel.
De-linking means precisely to de-link from Western totalitarian 
epistemology and its consequences in the ex-colonies of liberal/Chris-
tian and communist imperialism (in spite of Vladimir Lenin who saw 
imperialism as only linked to capitalism and not to communism). De-
linking takes us to decolonial thinking; that is, to a world that can no 
longer be imagined from within the hegemonic categories of thought 
that the Renaissance and Enlightenment elevated to a universal credo 
and which selected Greek and Latin as the only two languages and 
cosmologies of its foundation. The remaining languages, cosmologies, 
social and economic organizations, subjectivities, and human interac-
tions were all subjected to the final judgment of Greek and Latin and 
the six modern European imperial languages. To de-link means to 
remove oneself from that tyranny and to reinvest in what has been 
silenced, to make visible what has been rendered invisible, to affirm 
the presence of what has been declared absent. Categories of thought 
derived from Greek and Latin and translated into modern European 
languages are today global. De-linking and the decolonial shift require 
border thinking: thinking from the spaces that have been rendered 
silent and absent by the hegemony of Western categories of thought. In 
this regard, Don Quixote will be a good road companion, if we can de-
link from the cage in which canonical interpretations have continued 
to place it. •
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